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Changes that Challenge the Soul
Herbert A. Terry*
It is hard to dispute many of the descriptive elements of David
Bartlett's vision of future electronic journalism. Modem communications
technologies, which are abundant rather than scarce, are, indeed, undermining old communications industries and forcing revision of the laws and
policies that have traditionally governed them. Communications and
computing continue to converge and, in the process, old industry structures
distinguishing among print, broadcasting, cable television, and data
processing become less relevant. The work of journalists and the role they
play in society are changing dramatically. Journalists are less able to
function as authoritative gatekeepers. News consumers can already
circumvent gates, obtain more "raw"' information unprocessed by journalists, and demand information content and packaging custom-tailored to their
tastes and perceived information needs. These changes, already present but
likely to accelerate, can empower information consumers, profoundly
transforming the world of the journalist and the information consumer
alike.
Despite Bartlett's recognition of all these changes, however, Bartlett
believes there is some "soul" to "news machines" that either can or must
remain unalterable. Putting aside the question of whether machines have
souls, the essence of Bartlett's argument is that the center of the machine
has been the journalist. While the journalist's job will change substantially
in the emerging information environment, he states that basic freedoms of
the journalist-especially freedom from government regulation-must be
and can be recognized and protected in more or less the same ways as they
have been acknowledged in the past. This freedom, Bartlett appears to
believe, should be true despite the profound changes in the information
environment of which he is so well informed. That, however, is not

* Associate Professor of Telecommunications, Indiana University. A.B. (history)
Stanford University, 1970; M.A. (journalism) University of Minnesota, 1974; Ph.D.
(journalism and mass communication) University of Minnesota, 1976. Comments should be
addressed to: Herbert A. Terry, Department of Telecommunications, Radio-TV Center,
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; internet address terry@indiana.edu.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

necessarily true. The environment may be evolving in such fundamental
ways as to compel us to reassess the viability of "old souls" in the new
information world. Indeed, the most profound change may be that the
information consumer, rather than the journalist, occupies the center of this
new information world.
There are several points about Bartlett's argument that lead me to
raise these concerns. The first problem is Bartlett's inattention to how
changes in the communications environment alter the economics of mass
communication from the information consumer's perspective. Like many
advocates of market-based communications deregulation, Bartlett states that
relying on market forces to determine communications supply and content
is preferable to relying on government regulation and is adequate to fulfill
consumer needs. He further asserts, more seriously but without support, that
information in the emerging environment will be "affordable" to consumers. Bartlett's focus, then, is on liberating content producers and transmission system providers from government control. Rather, he should ask
whether affirmative law or policy may be required to protect information
consumer interests in an environment vastly different than that which has
existed with minimal change since the eighteenth century.
Bartlett's producer-oriented approach sometimes overlooks factors of
which, at other points in his argument, he is intensely aware. The emerging
communications environment is one where, to an increasing extent,
information providers must target increasingly specialized-and smaller-audiences. This kind of retargeting has economic and social effects that
Bartlett underplays. Until recently, mass communications media in the U.S.
have been relatively costless to consumers. Newspapers were cheap and
broadcast services almost free. Advertising paid the bills. Especially in
electronic media, consumers received that which attracted large audiences
and for which advertisers were willing to pay. While that certainly had
unfortunate consequences for information diversity, its effect was that basic
mass information was available to nearly all citizens at very low cost.
As Bartlett observes, however, that is changing unalterably. Cable
television is a good example of the consequences of the change. Many
advocates of market-based communications policy applaud the idea that
cable permits audiences to have a direct economic relationship with
information providers. Since consumers vote more directly with their
dollars for the information services they desire, at least in theory, those
services are more responsive to consumer needs than advertiser supported
services-provided that consumers can afford the new services.
Until just a few years ago, however, television was "free." Today,
millions of Americans pay more each month for cable TV than they pay for
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water and sewage services, and some receive no cable service at all because
they cannot afford it. This heightened emphasis on direct payment for
information risks stratifying participation in the "information stage" by
economic status or social class. Bartlett seems to dismiss the idea that
government might have to do something to prevent development of an
economically determined information underclass. 'Creation of such a class,
however, through government neglect, may be more important than the
issue of whether the government exercises any traditional content controls
over the superhighway.
Bartlett is right in believing that these trends will continue as scarcity
is further eliminated, and as transmission and information storage costs
decline. The new information environment will become, even more than
now, a "direct-pay" environment. Bartlett, however, brushes aside crucial
consequences of these changes that cannot be ignored or assumed benign.
Information in the future will have direct costs for consumers. While
technological scarcity may be nearly past, economic suarcity-the lack of
resources to buy things necessary for basic life-will become more
important in the information-dependent parts of our lives than it has been
in the past. It may well rise to a level comparable to housing, food,
transportation, and health care. The changes Bartlett describes seem likely
to force both media and political leaders to focus more on communications
law and policy from a consumer's perspective than from a producer's
perspective.
Will citizens, as Bartlett simply asserts, find information "affordable"?
Will institutions that are heavily dependent on information-schools and
universities-be able to pay for information "on demand," where, in the
past, they have purchased information collections-books--only once and
not paid for information reuse? What, if anything, should people do if some
information is socially or personally essential, but personally or institutionally unaffordable? Will that require expanded systems of information
subsidization (beyond less-than-cost postal or telephone rates and public
libraries)? Will notions such as "public broadcasting" (a media focus)
transform into notions of "public telecommunications" or even "public
information" in a sense far beyond the journalists' concerns of access to
public meetings and public records? Will consumers need the information
equivalent of food stamps in order to ensure that they are not left at the
side of the information superhighway or towed from the parking lot?
Answers to these questions are difficult and, as yet, unclear. The
issues, however, cannot be ignored through a romantic devotion to freedom
for information producers and distributors. Consumers have long had
differential economic ability to participate in information marketplaces, but

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

in the past they usually got basic services through advertiser-supported
mass media. That seems to be changing fundamentally; indeed, it may be
one indication that we are moving beyond the age of mass communication
itself. These economic changes will force increased attention to the
distribution of access to information and communications systems, and the
possible remedies for their adverse effects upon individuals and society.
In the end, the digital information age may require reconsideration of
even our most fundamental principles of freedom of expression and, in
turn, First Amendment constitutional law. Here, too, Bartlett's analysis is
romantic and idealistic more than it is realistic. Bartlett believes that the
best way (and perhaps the only way) to protect the information interests of
consumers is to protect content producers and distributors from government
regulation. While this is a well-tested and effective approach, it may now
be simplistic and its benefits may be overstated in the emerging information
environment.
Bartlett greatly overstates both the historical and contemporary
pervasiveness of electronic media content regulation. Despite the persistence in some areas of electronic content regulation such as political
broadcasting, obscenity, and children's television requirements, the general
picture is one of few direct content controls and of historical skepticism
about content regulation. Government's real power over electronic media
has always been its ability to control entry through mechanisms like
licensing and franchising. While content regulations as part of the licensing
and franchising processes have usually been slight, it is valid to believe that
electronic communicators have, at times, altered content to avoid licensing
or franchising controversies.
Given this, the most important concern ought not to be whether
government will resort to content regulation in the more diverse modern
information environment. That has not happened much in the past and
seems unlikely now. It is probably not even practical, given the vast
proliferation of channels and messages. Government efforts to regulate
content are likely to be unsuccessful because those efforts will be
overwhelmed by the volume of content. What will matter, more than
content controls, are structural issues-who gets to do what under what
conditions. In addressing those issues, debates over policies on the
information superhighway are likely to focus on the interests and rights of
information pathway owners to decide what information to carry, their
rights-if any-to become content producers as well as distributors, and the
interests of consumers in being able to reach others through these new
pathways and to receive information from diverse sources. If anything, the
technological developments Bartlett outlines seem likely to heighten, not
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erase, constitutional law debates about the First Amendment rights of
information consumers to receive information. While Bartlett would like the
future to be mainly concerned with print-derived models of media freedom
from government control, a more likely result, and perhaps a more
desirable one, is an amplification of the lines of thought already found in
broadcasting and telephony. These lines of thought promote First Amendment values and interests of consumers to receive information and to use
effective means of communication for self-expression.
If we go down this path, we will obviously be rethinking much of our
First Amendment cultural heritage. That, too, is desirable and inevitable
given changes in our culture, our media, and the interplay between the two.
A final concern about Bartlett's vision is its Western orientation toward
freedom of expression. The changes in communications technology that
Bartlett describes do not respect natural or national boundaries. His vision
of expression that is free from government control and left to the initiative
of privately owned capitalistic media is not similarly global. Our notions
of freedom of expression are derived from well-known "usual suspects"
ranging from Mill and Milton to Rehnquist, Kahn, and Limbaugh. We are
intellectually linked to our "founding fathers" and Western enlightenment
thought in ways not shared by people and nations whose interests,
traditions, and backgrounds cannot be ignored in a global information
environment. Different cultural ideas about freedom of expression will
collide in this increasingly interconnected environment. If we seek to
impose our values upon that global system and, in turn, upon participants
in it who come from different heritages, we risk, at best, miscommunication
and, at worst, outright conflict over information policies. Bartlett argues for
a universal, unchanging "soul." That soul, whatever it is, transcends
changes in culture and technology. It seems more likely that the future of
global, instantaneous, interactive, digitally based, electronic communications
poses real challenges to those basic traditions and requires new approaches.
We will be forced, more than before, to focus on how communications law
and policy promote the interests of information consumers. We must
become more respectful of communications policies different from our own.
We need not lose our soul, but we may have to be more situational about
it than we, as well as Bartlett, have been in the past.
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